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Introduction  
Much attention is focused on the use of ‘soft power’ and specifically how sports events are 
used by nations to generate a more benevolent global image. Modern nation states are 
increasingly developing their own particular ‘soft power’ activities, drawing upon different 
resources and have different audiences in mind. Until relatively recently, the state of Israel was 
preoccupied with its military security and paid little attention to cultural politics. However, 
because of the military dominance of Israel other ‘battlegrounds’ have emerged. Academic 
research on soft power and sport has traditionally focused on high profile events (such as the 
FIFA World Cup finals and Summer Olympic Games). This paper spotlights an international 
sports event which, although relatively small and usually attracting limited interest from the 
mainstream media, when held in Israel, highlights regional politics, the role of UEFA/FIFA 
and becomes part of a wider debate over international public opinion.  
Grix and Himpler (2007) identified how the United States used soft power as an alternative to 
its military activities and to counter its negative image post-2003 Iraq war, something that 
echoes Germany’s use of sport to address the legacy of its Third Reich (Grix and Houlihan, 
2013). This paper seeks to complement and extend the existing discussion by focusing on how 
the Israeli state is using smaller sports events, as one of its many soft power (‘hasbara’) 
activities, in an attempt to arrest its deteriorating international image. The paper begins by 
briefly outlining the concepts of public diplomacy and soft power. The specific principles of 
‘hasbara’ are explained with illustrations showing how the concept is empirically 
operationalised (‘hasbara in action’). The paper cites UEFA’s Men’s U-21 tournament held in 
Israel in 2013 to assess how the different groups responded to the event. An evaluation is made 
of the rhetoric that surrounded the event in print media and online: celebratory by the host 
nation, the Israeli Football Association (IFA) and UEFA, and supporters of the Israeli state; 
 
 
highly critical amongst Palestinians and their supporters in the wider international community. 
The event is used to inform a wider discussion on the politics of sport and the role of soft power 
(here, hasbara) within the realpolitik of the Israel / Palestine conflict. 
 
Public diplomacy and soft power  
The concept of ‘public diplomacy’ as a distinct form of diplomatic activity first appeared in 
the late 1960s as part of the United States government’s attempted to destabilise the Soviet 
bloc. It emerged in response to a growing awareness of the limitations of traditional diplomacy 
and the need for the US political establishment to seek alternative ways to advance its foreign 
policy whilst avoiding accusations of conducting overt ideological propaganda. The concept 
lay undeveloped until the 9/11/2001 attacks on the USA; after this event, many Western 
powers, and the USA in particular, realised they needed to respond to the changing nature of 
international relations, to address their international image and to re-engage with new forms of 
public diplomacy.  
Nye (1990; 2004; 2008) developed and popularised the concept of ‘soft power’ which was seen 
as a guide on how to promote US foreign policy.1 Nye’s work was built on Organski’s (1968) 
discussion of intangible forms of power and persuasion and Baldwin’s (1979; 1985) work on 
the different forms of statecraft. Soft power was defined by Nye (2004: x) as, 
the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. 
[...] Soft power arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and 
policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power 
is enhanced. 
Nye’s claim was that in a rapidly changing political and technological global environment, in 
order for the US to maintain its dominance, it would need to master information and 
communication technology (ICT) and use it to set the political agenda and determine the 
framework of debate in a way that shapes others’ preferences’ (Nye, 1990: 166). Developments 
in ICT allowed newer forms of ‘public diplomacy’ to emerge and generated greater awareness 
of public relations, marketing and media. The development of soft power and new forms of 
public diplomacy led to a shift away from foreign policy being established and maintained 
through ‘gun-boat’ diplomacy that typically involved politicians, civil servants and established 
 
 
policy-makers. The focus shifted to one which cultivated wider public opinion by promoting 
positive images and values with engaged media ‘pundits’ and a broader public in an attempt to 
engender greater legitimacy. Whilst Nye (2004:2) explained soft power as an option to ‘attract 
and co-opt’ he acknowledged the continued role of hard power and its coercive strength to 
secure a desired outcome. Although still able to draw upon its hard power (i.e. military and 
economic strength), soft power would allow the US to utilise less tangible (but not necessarily 
less effective) resources to appeal more directly to the public in other countries. Combining 
military power and economic strength with soft power would produce ‘smart power’ which, 
according to Nye (2004:32), would help maintain the dominance of the US as the global super 
power. 
The early work on public diplomacy and soft power contained a strong bias towards a United 
States worldview and has been challenged by those who question Nye’s approach. The concept 
of soft power was criticized as containing an assumption that it will create a positive outcome 
for all parties. As Lepp and Gibson (2001, cited in Grix and Lee, 2013) have illustrated, soft 
power is used to draw attention away from any number of negative issues such as war, 
terrorism, poverty, gender inequalities, unemployment, crime and corruption, and poor 
standards in education and healthcare. While it is seen as a preferable form of diplomacy for 
the 21st century, Falk (2012) has argued that significant power still resides in the use of hard 
power (i.e. military) and economics such as financial loans and / or membership of political 
institutions (EU, WTO, NATO etc). As Grix and Lee (2013: 526) have noted, ‘neither Nye nor 
other “soft power” scholars tend to spend much time pondering who decides exactly what 
“attractive” is in international relations.’ The growing use of soft power may be seen to reflect 
the gradual economic and military decline of the US. The ultimate aim of soft power is not 
necessarily benign as its normative bias can be seen as promoting US institutions, its particular 
approach to democracy, its popular culture and - by association - its underpinning ideology. As 
such, soft power can be interpreted as an exercise in the continuation of US neo-liberalism, its 
imperialist ambitions and a continued disregard for any genuine move towards a post-colonial 
agenda for self-determination.  
 
Sports events and soft power  
 
 
Recent years have seen significant interest in the political instrumentality associated with 
staging international sports events with nation states investing in staging mega-events using a 
rationale of ‘urban regeneration’ and / or ‘place branding.’ High profile sports events have 
become highly sought-after commodities (Nauright, 2004) and are increasingly being used to 
establish a global identify and / or improve a nation’s international public image (Hall, 1989; 
1992; Grix and Lee, 2013). As Horne (2007) and Roche (2000) have identified, sports mega-
events have become an exemplary means to transmit promotional messages to a global 
audience. As signifiers of modernity which embody and reflect neo-liberal policies (Hall, 
2006), Jackson (2013) has discussed ‘the contested terrain of sports diplomacy in a globalising 
world’ with Manzenreiter (2010) identifying an emerging discourse that identifies the abstract 
and intangible benefits of hosting mega-events.  
As Grix and Lee (2013: 527) note, sport is presented as having universal appeal and thus 
hosting an international event allows the host to demonstrate,  
that they not only share those values …[and that] … they are guardians of universal 
norms and … [can] … champion and collectively celebrate these within the context of 
their own distinctive cultural, social and political values illuminating truths such as 
fair play that have universal appeal. 
The FIFA World Cup Finals, the UEFA Championship Finals, and the IOC Summer and 
Winter Olympic Games are the established sport mega-events, with the secondary tier of sports 
events equally sought-after by smaller nation states (these include the IAAF and FINA 
Championships, the Pan American Games, Commonwealth Games, Asian Games, the African 
Cup of Nations, the UEFA Champions League final, F1 races, ICC and Rugby Union finals). 
Although smaller in scale and media interest, these events are accessible to those countries 
which (due to their size) would not be able to host a mega-event. Although the Men’s U-21 
tournament is one such event which does not attract extensive media or public interest, it is 
organised by UEFA/FIFA and therefore carries a level of prestige not found in many other 
sports events. 
 
Grix and Lee (2013) identified a number of sports mega-events (e.g. South Africa, 2010 FIFA 
World Cup; China, 2008 Olympic Games; India, 2010 Commonwealth Games; Russia, 2014 
Winter Olympics; and forthcoming, Russia, 2018 FIFA World Cup; Qatar, 2022 FIFA World 
Cup) where the host nation has sought to exploit their hosting of the event to improve its 
 
 
international image (see also Grix and Houlihan, 2013). Cornelissen (2008) has shown how 
South Africa attempted this by hosting the 2010 FIFA World Cup and whilst Alegi (2008) has 
shown how sports politics and diplomacy were expressions of soft power in a South African 
context. Manzenreiter (2010) identified how international stereotypes and misconceptions were 
difficult barriers to overcome for those nations seeking to change their global image, with 
Brannagan and Giulianotti (2014) identifying how the Qatari state is seeking to distance itself 
from the region’s wider socio-political issues by hosting the 2022 FIFA World Cup Finals. 
 
When a national government decides to support hosting a major sports event, especially if it is 
seeking to address a negative international image, there are risks. This is particularly so for 
those states that already have a poor international reputation (Grix and Lee, 2013). Such 
countries need to ensure the event is subject to careful ‘impression management’ if a positive 
image is to be created and presented and result in greater international political legitimacy for 
the host. The global communication processes which now operate (Grix and Lee, 2013) mean 
that extensive effort is needed to ensure the mainstream news media are ‘on message’ and give 
priority coverage to the ‘positive’ messages identified by the host. The host can influence 
individual journalists with ‘junkets’ and official tours and underpin this with the threat to 
withdraw press accreditation if they drift too far from the ‘official script.’ The emergence of 
new / social media and the emergence of ‘citizen journalism’ (Hänska-Ahy and Shapour, 2013; 
Greer and McLaughlin, 2010) has led to an increase in distinctly ‘off message’ reporting which 
has embarrassed the hosts (such as the Formula 1 international motor races in Bahrain, 2012 
and 2013 - see Brown, 2013). In many cases the legitimacy sought by the hosts can quickly 
diminish with Grix and Lee (2013) identifying as examples the 2010 Commonwealth Games 
in India, the 2012 UEFA Championships in Poland / Ukraine, the 2014 Winter Olympics in 
Sochi (Russia), FIFA 2014 in Brazil, and FIFA 2020 in Qatar. 
 
Previous research has concentrated on the use of sports ‘mega-events’ by emerging states and 
/ or advanced capitalist nations with a growing body of work accounting for the use of sports 
events by the state during Israel’s formative era (see for example Galily and Ben-Porat, 
2012; Sorek, 2007). The paper focuses on the key actors involved in the specific discourse 
surrounding U-21 event: specifically the Israeli FA, the Palestinian FA, the Israeli state, 
supporters of the Israeli state, and supporters of the Palestinians. Drawing upon news 
reporting of the event, and advocacy material issued by both ‘sides’ in the conflict, the 
 
 
paper identifies how a relatively small sports event can be seen as part of Israel’s hasbara 
strategy and was designed to improve its international image. The discussion draws upon 
Manzenreiter’s (2010) and Brannagan and Giulianotti (2014) observation that ‘raising a state’s 
profile is one thing; managing it is another’ by examining the actions of both those who 
supported, and those opposed to, Israel hosting this event. Nygard and Gates’ (2013) 
mechanism of sports diplomacy and politics (i.e. image building, building a platform for 
dialogue, trust building, reconciliation, integration and anti-racism) work is also used to inform 
an assessment of the contemporary landscape and how soft power is being used by both Israeli 
and Palestinian supporters. The aim of the paper is to navigate through these complex debates 
and examine Israel’s hosting of an international sport event, the response of the Palestinians 
and the role played by the sport’s governing bodies, specifically UEFA/FIFA. 
 
Israel‘s hasbara strategy 
The state of Israel was created and maintained through military power. Despite being victorious 
in many of its wars, most significantly in 1948, 1967 and 1973 (‘it cannot afford to lose’), the 
two Palestinian Intifadas (1987-1993 and 2000-2005) have caused significant damage to 
Israel’s international image. The two wars in Lebanon (1982-1985 and 2006) and the 
occupation of territory since 1967, the isolation of (and repeated incursion into) the Gaza Strip, 
the building of the ‘Peace Wall’, and the continued construction of illegal settlements on the 
‘West Bank’ have all increased international public criticism of the Israeli state.2 Israel can no 
longer rely solely on its militarily dominance and in an attempt to counter the growing 
perception of the country as a place of war, terrorism, intolerance and religious conflict, 
coupled to increasing support for Palestinian human rights and an emerging narrative that seeks 
to compare Israel with apartheid South Africa, the Israeli government has invested heavily in 
‘hasbara’ (Bazz, 2015; Blumenthal, 2012; Ravid, 2013). 
 
The Israeli Foreign Ministry (2005) states there is no precise translation of the word ‘hasbara’ 
in English or in any other language. Israeli public diplomacy and the concept of hasbara have 
been defined variously as propaganda, whitewashing, explaining, information providing, 
public diplomacy, re-branding and overseas image-building (IFM, 2005; Ravid, 2012; 
Schulman, 2011; 2012). The primary cause of Israel’s poor international image has been seen 
as a failure of hasbara (i.e. ‘to explain’) rather than the actions of the state (Molad, 2012; 
 
 
Gilboa, 2006; 2008). Originally a campaign co-ordinated by the Israeli Foreign Ministry, 
hasbara is currently coordinated by the Ministry of Public Diplomacy and Diaspora Affairs 
(Blumenthal, 2013). Other official advocacy bodies which promote Israel overseas include the 
Israeli Foreign Ministry, Prime Minister's Office, the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) Spokesman's 
Office, the Ministry of Tourism and Culture, and the Jewish Agency - each of which contains 
a dedicated hasbara unit (Blumenthal, 2013) and which operates its own Facebook, Twitter, 
YouTube, and Flickr accounts (Molad, 2012). Israel’s public diplomacy efforts (i.e. hasbara) 
require an extensive communications strategy to coordinate its communication with the foreign 
media in Israel and overseas with multiple social networks and new media technologies fully 
utilised to created ‘one of the most sophisticated and effective public diplomacy apparatuses in 
the world’ (Molad, 2012: 24). Professional staff are supported by volunteers with both parties 
accessing an ‘Official Hasbara Handbook’ to guide their activities across the mainstream and 
social media. According to Blumenthal (2013) this can involve relentlessly harassing 
(‘trolling’) those who express scepticism about official Israeli policy or show sympathy for the 
Palestinians by accusing them of anti-Semitism. 
In 2005 in response to a growing international boycott of Israeli organisations operating in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), the Foreign Ministry began a ‘Brand Israel’ public 
relations campaign as part of hasbara. They recognised that ‘images on television have a much 
greater and immediate impact on what the public abroad feels about Israel, than the arguments 
Israel presents’ (IFM, 2005; see also Schulman, 2012). The Foreign Ministry suggested that 
international audiences are not willing to invest time or energy in trying to understand the 
complex history of the region and that their collective memory is short. They go on to claim 
that there exists an ‘automatic emotional support for the Third World, anti-globalism, hatred 
of the United States and other such agendas … [that] … favour the Palestinians over Israel’. In 
order to counter this, there is a need for greater public diplomacy and to use ‘high-quality 
printed materials and multimedia materials […and …] a state-of-the-art computerized system’, 
with Israeli diplomatic staff required to meet not only with ‘government officials, the media, 
and Jewish communities abroad’ but also ‘with students and professors, ethnic and religious 
leaders, as well as key people in the business world and in the arts and sciences’ (IFM, 2005). 
Hasbara-related activity is increasingly focused on the activities of the Boycott, Divestment 
and Sanctions (BDS) movement. In 2005 a campaign endorsed by over 170 Palestinian 
individuals and organisations from Palestinian civil society (those side-lined from both state-
 
 
to-state negotiations and in the armed struggle), called for a programme of boycott, divestment 
and sanctions until Israel complies with international law and ensures the fundamental rights 
of Palestinian people under the universal principles of Human Rights (Bakan and Abu-Laban, 
2009; Barghouti, 2011). Hasbara has sought to discredit this campaign arguing that instead of 
traditional anti-Semitism (which attacked individual Jews and their communities), attacks on 
‘the Jews’ are now made via the state of Israel. This is based on the claim that Europeans have 
- and continue to hold – a long-standing (for some pathological) hatred of the Jews (Klug, 2012; 
Tait, 2013; Weinthal, 2014).3 How else, supporters of the Israeli state argue, can one explain 
why Israel is subject to so much criticism and is judged by different standards to those applied 
to many other countries?4 This ‘disguised’ form of anti-Semitism is expressed in terms of 
undermining Israel’s legitimacy, denying its right to exist and demonizing the Israeli / Jewish 
state (the collective approach known by a ‘3D’ mnemonic of delegitimisation, double standards 
and demonization, see Sharansky, 2004). Although this approach is acknowledged as lacking 
rigour (Molad, 2012), it allows criticism of the Israeli state to be dismissed as anti-Semitic 
rather than anti-Zionist.  
 
‘Hasbara in action’  
Each nation state has different resources available to advance their international public 
diplomacy efforts. This section discusses some of the resources available to Israel and how 
they coordinate their efforts through hasbara. Although Israel is a relatively small country (in 
terms of area and population), it has, for a variety of different reasons, access to resources to 
develop cultural exchanges far beyond the capacity of its immediate neighbours. Having 
militarily defeated their enemies, the Israeli state is shifting from ‘warfare to lawfare’ and is 
increasingly working through different organisations (e.g. American Israel Public Affairs 
Committee, Anti-Deformation League, Israel Project, the Jewish Agency, Jewish National 
Fund, Sharut HaDin,5 StandWithUs, United Israel Appeal, We Believe in Israel, World Zionist 
Organisation, Zionist Organisation of America) to counter criticism made of the state. Israel 
has highly developed science, electronics, technology and R&D industries, many of which are 
closely linked to the education system and its military (IDF), the latter of which lies at the heart 
of Israeli society.  
 
 
The Israeli state has established numerous projects that seek to engage both Israeli citizens, 
young Jewish people, philosemites and those supportive of Zionism in order to advance the 
hasbara agenda (Molad, 2012). Under the ‘law of return’ Jewish people located anywhere in 
the world have an automatic right to Israeli citizenship6 with the Jewish Agency (as part of the 
World Zionist Organisation) one of many organisations which promotes Jewish emigration to 
Israel (‘aliyah’7). Automatic citizenship and numerous incentives are available including free 
return trips to Israel, financial and social benefits and tax exemptions all of which are designed 
to encourage aliyah (Hayeem, 2010). Those considering aliyah are guided towards locations 
within Israel proper, but also to areas around Jerusalem despite many of these settlements being 
on illegally annexed land and in direct violation of international law.8 
The Jewish Diaspora is a significant ambassadorial source of soft power for the Israeli state 
and allows it access to well-established social networks through Jewish cultural exchange 
programmes and specific hasbara programmes, many of which target US and European 
campuses (Blumenthal, 2013). Campuses have become key sites in the struggle for public 
opinion with the Israeli government offering scholarships and ‘fellowships’ to those willing to 
actively promote Israel on campus – especially on social media (Bannoura, 2014). Investment 
in this area is due, in part, to the growing academic boycott of Israeli institutions (British 
Committee for Universities of Palestine, 2013; Goldberg, 2014; Rose and Rose, 2008).9 In 
2009 the British Universities and Colleges Union (UCU) voted to support an academic boycott 
of Israeli educational institutions, followed in 2013 by the American Studies Association 
(ASA). In 2014 the Modern Language Association (MLA) passed a resolution criticising Israel 
for restricting the right of US scholars to enter the West Bank to work at Palestinian 
Universities. Academic campuses in North America and Europe have seen student protest 
during the ‘Israel Apartheid Week’ (IAW), an advocacy event supported by BDS campaigners 
with various pro-Israel / Zionist groups challenging IAW event and the wider BDS narrative. 
Amongst the ‘soft power’ resources the Israeli state has at its disposal are ones linked to 
religion and sexual orientation. The biblical history of the region and the shared religious 
heritage of Judaism and Christianity have allowed the Israeli state to build support amongst 
certain religious groups around the world. Israel’s Ministry of Tourism has worked with 
influential Evangelical Christians (Christian Zionists) in an attempt to develop ‘ambassadors’ 
who advocate on behalf of the state of Israel, of ‘Eretz Israel’10 and specifically the city of 
Jerusalem (Bryant, 2013; Spector, 2008). This ‘faith-based diplomacy’ has generated 
 
 
significant growth in Christian tourism, especially from developing countries such as Brazil, 
South Korea and Nigeria, states that have not traditionally supported Israel (Bryant, 2013). 
This particular form of diplomacy takes on greater resonance as the more progressive Christian 
groups and charities increasingly support the call for boycott, divestment and sanctions 
(Eleftheriou-Smith, 2014; Posner, 2014; Wyatt, 2014). 
In 2011 Tel Aviv was named the world’s best gay tourist destination (Haaretz, 2012). This 
award was a consequence of the international advertising campaign conducted by the Israel’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs which promoted the country to the LGBTQ community as a 
modern, gay-friendly destination. Criticised as ‘pinkwashing’ (Schulman, 2011) this marketing 
strategy was seen as an attempt by Israel to exploit the fight against homophobia by drawing 
attention away from its violation of Palestinian human rights, its occupation of the West Bank, 
ongoing blockade of Gaza and building of its ‘peace wall.’ There is also the suggestion that 
Israel has used this particular issue to emphasise homophobia in Palestinian society and depict 
neighbouring Arab countries as reactionary and intolerant. 
There have been efforts to bring Israelis and Palestinians together through various cultural and 
educational projects (such as the Barenboim-Said Foundation USA, Brighton University’s 
Football-4-Peace project, various UNESCO initiatives and the Peres Centre for Peace, see 
Yashar, 2014). However, the BDS movement has called for an international boycott of all 
organisations which receive funding from the Israeli state, including the Batsheva dance 
company, whose performances are repeatedly disrupted by ‘Don’t Dance with Israeli 
Apartheid’ protestors (Orr, 2012). Film makers, writers, artists, performers and musicians have 
refused to appear in Israel stating their appearance might be seen as condoning Israeli 
government policy (Electronic Intifada, 2006). However, others continue to visit, exhibit and 
perform in Israel on the grounds that ‘bridge-building’ between the different communities is 
better than isolation, an echo of the argument used by those who performed in apartheid South 
Africa. 
 
UEFA’s Men’s Under-21 Tournament, 2013,  
The UEFA Men’s Under-21 Championship is a biannual tournament that has operated in its 
current format since 1978. In January 2011 UEFA awarded the championship to Israel. This 
would be the biggest soccer event staged in Israel and the most high profile international 
 
 
sporting event since it had hosted the Paralympic Games in 1968. At the outset it is necessary 
to highlight that there was no direct link or explicitly acknowledgement by the Israeli 
government in respect of the U-21 UEFA championships. FIFA (and UEFA) are particular 
sensitive to government interference in the operation of a national FA and have suspended (but 
rarely expelled) those deemed to have transgressed.11 Cognisant of this the Israeli government 
does not directly involve itself but works through others, primarily the Israeli FA (IFA), but 
also through its broader hasbara operation (outline previously); ultimately, in matters relating 
to national security the Israeli state has the final word. 
 
In the build-up to the tournament the English FA and German FA cooperated with IFA on a 
number of ‘football for all’ and anti-racist initiatives (Willenzik, 2013; Ynetnews, 2013). 
Staging the tournament was an opportunity for Israel to attract public and media interest ‘for 
the right reasons’ (Dann, 2013) and, according to one of the German team players (Lasogga), 
would allow Israel to “show a different side of itself from the politics and what you see on the 
television” (quoted in Masters, 2013). A number of Zionist organisations (i.e. StandWithUs, 
the Zionist Federation and the Fair Play Campaign Group) asked English supporters to write 
to their U-21 players to wish them luck and to express hope that they enjoy their experience in 
Israel, but not to make reference to anything political or the attempted boycott of this 
tournament (Lipan, 2013). The tournament was promoted by the IFA, UEFA and the Israeli 
state as an opportunity to bring together diverse groups, to promote mutual respect and 
tolerance on and off the field and to portray the Israeli state as a democracy (Willenzik, 2013). 
The Israeli U-21 squad contained six Israeli-Arab players (Taylor, 2013) which reflected the 
17%-20% Israeli-Arab population of Israel (depending if one includes Palestinians living in 
East Jerusalem and Druze in the Golan Heights); this part of the population, Palestinians living 
in pre-1967 Israel, occupy a very different position to Palestinians living as refugees in 
neighbouring countries, in the Palestinian diaspora and those living in the West Bank and Gaza 
(Shor and Yonay, 2010; Sorek, 2005; 2007).  
 
As noted above, when a national government chooses to support the hosting of a sports event 
there is no guarantee it will go according to plan. Successfully managing a state’s international 
image during a sports event, across both the mainstream and social media, has become 
increasingly difficult as the event can offer a platform for protestors to highlight ‘messages’ 
different to those promoted by the hosts. In the period immediately prior to UEFA’s designation 
 
 
of tournament host, fighting between the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) and Hamas fighters in 
the Gaza Strip resulted in 139 deaths (6 Israelis and 133 Palestinians) and over 1000 people 
wounded (240 Israelis / 840 Palestinians)  (see Beaumont, 2015).  
 
The main sports stadium in Gaza was hit by the IDF, who claiming it was being used to launch 
rockets, killed four youngsters playing football in the stadium (Ogden, 2012). When UEFA 
announced their host country various organisations called upon UEFA to revoke its decision, 
including the Palestinian FA, the Palestine Solidarity Campaign and the Muslim Public Affairs 
Committee (UK). 24 British MPs12 put forward an ‘Early Day Motion 640’ titled ‘Racism in 
Football and European Football Tournament in Israel’ which stated,  
That this House congratulates the Football Association for its Kick It Out campaign 
against racism in football; registers with profound disapproval, however, that the FA 
is prepared to participate in the European Under-21 football tournament to be played 
in Israel in June 2013, even though Israel is geographically not in Europe and is a 
country which has policies of racial apartheid against Palestinians; and therefore calls 
on the Government to support the Red Card Israeli Apartheid campaign which calls for 
this European football tournament to be played in Europe (Russell, 2012).  
 
The British Guardian newspaper carried a letter from Archbishop Desmond Tutu (2013), 
politicians and others, under the heading ‘UEFA insensitivity to Palestinians' plight,’ which 
stated their shock at UEFA’s decision to award the tournament to Israel and outlined their 
concern that Israel would use the event to “whitewash its racist denial of Palestinian rights and 
its illegal occupation of Palestinian land.” The footballer Freddie Kanoute, French-born of 
Malian descent and a Muslim, launched a petition that initially claimed to include a number of 
high profile football players; however, when some players subsequently denied they had given 
their explicit support, Kanoute responded by stating that they had been told to distance 
themselves from the campaign (Ogden, 2012). Immediately before the tournament began, Pro-
Palestinian supporters staged a demonstration outside the UEFA Congress in London and 
disrupted a private dinner held for the UEFA delegates and invited guests (Warshaw, 2013); a 
further demonstration took place in Amsterdam on the eve of the UEFA Champions League 
Final. 
 
 
 
When Michel Platini met with pro-Palestine campaigners at FIFA headquarters he said he 
would ‘think about’ moving the tournament (Abunimah, 2013). However, he later stated that 
UEFA and the Israeli FA were responsible for football and could not be held responsible for 
the politics of governments. Two years previously Platini had met Palestinian football officials 
and implied he would suspend Israel’s membership of UEFA because of the restrictions they 
were imposing on Palestinian football players,  
We accepted them [Israel] in Europe and furnished them the conditions for membership 
and they must respect the letter of the laws and international regulations otherwise 
there is no justification for them to remain in Europe. Israel must choose between 
allowing Palestinian sport to continue and prosper or be forced to face the 
consequences for their behaviour (Palestinian Information Centre, 2010). 
 
Upon securing the tournament the IFA described the event as an ‘amazing opportunity’ to 
promote the country and its footballing community not just to Europe, but to a global audience 
(Sanderson and Hart, 2011). The event would allow their national team to participate at the 
highest level and improve the country’s infrastructure and raise expectations within Israeli 
football (Sanderson and Hart, 2011). Prior to the tournament’s first game UEFA announced 
that 100,000 tickets had been sold; this was seen as a marker of the tournaments ‘success’ given 
that the 2011 tournament (in Denmark) sold some 50,000 tickets (Daskal, 2013). Average 
attendance was around 11,500 which was approximately 70% take-up of the total tournament 
capacity. A cumulative global audience of over 120 million followed the tournament via 
television, with 1.9m visits and 7.6m page views made to UEFA.com during the tournament; 
in addition some 100,000 fans linked to its U21 Facebook page and 9,000 followed its 
@UEFAUnder21 twitter account (UEFA, 2013). At the end of the tournament Platini 
complimented the IFA for organising a successful tournament which saw no political violence 
or reports of demonstration within the country during the event; for Platini this vindicated 
UEFA’s decision not to move the event. Platini stated that Israel had the same rights as the 
other 53 UEFA member nations to bid and host tournaments and that UEFA’s decision had 
been ‘to do what is good for football and not for politics’ (Warshaw, 2013). 
 
Discussion 
Securing the U-21 tournament was a major accomplishment for the Israeli state. Unlike those 
nations which have sought to use sports events to advance its economic growth, the priority for 
 
 
Israel was to present a positive international image and seek greater acceptance, especially 
within European sporting circles. Using Nygard and Gates’ (2013) mechanism of sports 
diplomacy it can be suggested that the IFA has used (international) football to support 
campaigns around anti-racism, but have been prevented by the Israeli government / state 
from extending this to meaningful, sustained activities around integration and trust 
building; by contrast the Palestinians FA have used football for ‘image building’ of the 
nascent state /territories. At the same time, the tournament allowed the Israeli state to 
present an alternative image to the recent conflicts in southern Lebanon and the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories (OPT) of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The success of the U-21 
tournament claimed by UEFA and the IFA has given the latter greater influence within the 
former with the lack of protest within the country improving the country’s potential to host 
future international sports events.13 Although its size will limit its ability to host a truly mega-
event, securing smaller international events will allow Israel to present itself as a ‘normal’ 
country and to gain greater acceptance in the international (sporting) community.14  
 
Given that Israeli teams currently play in European club and national competitions supporters 
of the Palestinian cause have turned to UEFA and FIFA. However, UEFA have repeatedly 
stated that neither they, nor the Israeli FA, can be held responsible for the politics of the region 
or the decisions of the Israeli state. Michel Platini’s claim that ‘I don’t do politics, I do football’ 
is a re-statement of the canard that ‘sport and politics don’t mix’ and a clear echo of those 
governing bodies which supported the maintenance of sporting contacts with apartheid South 
Africa. When FIFA recognised Israel and Palestine and admitted them into world football it, 
unwittingly, became involved in much wider geo-political issues. The IFA are caught between 
the Israeli state and UEFA/FIFA and an environment in which everything is seen through the 
lens of national security. Although the IFA has attempted to work with its Palestinian 
counterpart and with Arabs who live within Israel’s pre-1967 borders, they admit they have no 
influence in matters of national security and the safety of the Israeli population (AP, 2013). 
The Israeli state has been careful not to be seen to interfere with football, as demonstrated by 
their lack of direct involvement in the U-21 tournament, and whilst UEFA/FIFA have the 
ability to exclude the IFA from its competitions, they have not done so, not least because they 
see themselves as a non-political organisation and fear the possibility of being labelled as anti-
Semitic if they did sanction the IFA.  
 
 
 
The Palestinian FA have also recognised the potential of sport and have been adept at exploiting 
football to advance their agenda. They have put themselves forward to host the symbolic annual 
FIFA Congress in 2017 which, if successful, would force Israel to allow access for all of the 
delegations from FIFA’s 209 member associations. Highlighting the travel restriction placed 
on players and officials leaving and entering the Occupied Territories, the PFA have called for 
the expulsion of the IFA from UEFA/FIFA; however, during FIFA’s pre-tournament 
conference in Brazil, 2014, the PFA withdrew this call in response to the IFA and FIFA 
agreeing to hold an investigation into the issue of free movement of players and officials. 
Whilst the FIFA president has stated his desire to see the PFA and IFA sign a formal co-
operation agreement, what is evident is that IFA, the PFA, UEFA/FIFA are having to negotiate 
much wider (hard) political issues relating to national security, regional and geo-politics.  
 
The soft power opportunities that arose with the staging of this event need to be read against a 
wider narrative. Whilst Israel used the tournament to promote its football and nation, supporters 
of the Palestinian cause used it to advance a different agenda. Whether or not Israel is seen as 
an ethnocracy, apartheid or colonial-settler state, supporters of the Palestinian cause need to 
assess whether sport is an Israeli ‘weak spot.’ During the era of South African apartheid, many 
white South Africans took great pride from the sporting prowess of their rugby and cricket 
players, something that gave the sporting boycott a particular resonance (Donnelly, 2008). 
Some claim that sanctions / boycott of Israeli science, technology, education and (non-sporting) 
culture would have a greater impact as these activities are more highly valued (Banks, 2013). 
Despite the trope that ‘Jews don’t like sport’ a survey by Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics 
showed the most common leisure activity was sport with Israeli men more engaged than 
women (55% compared to 24%) and watched more sports events (Lior, 2012). In the 2009-10 
season average attendance at Israeli Premier League games was ranked 22nd across Europe. 
According to Dann (2012) this position corresponded with the quality of the league and Israeli 
teams' achievements in European football competitions. Although attendances have dipped 
slightly in recent years this can be read against the standard of play and how the English 
Premier League and matches involving other top flight European clubs are watched by 
audiences across the world (Pilger, 2014; Yeuh, 2014). Given the racist stereotype of the non-
sporting / non-physical Jew (Dee, 2012; Klein 2000)15 is just that, it is suggested that sport will 
continue to be a site for Israeli and Palestinian soft power activities. 
 
 
 
However, excluding Israel from sports governing bodies and tournaments will have a more 
symbolic than economic impact on the country. While sport is not a substitute for the job of 
politicians, it is in a position to contribute to a programme of political, moral and cultural 
awareness-raising in the best tradition of public diplomacy and soft power. Soft power 
expressed through sports sanctions and / or a cultural / academic boycott are individually 
unlikely to make a significant impact on behaviour of the Israeli state. However, their 
cumulative impact on international public opinion has led the Israeli state to invest significantly 
in its hasbara apparatus. Sport can be used to introduce international audiences to the politics 
of the region and perhaps lead them to reflect on where they stand on the issue of Israel / 
Palestine. The next question would be whether they engage in the debate to better understand 
the issues and ultimately what, if any, action they chose to take. 
 
This paper has identified how the Israeli state has an abundant range of soft power resources at 
its disposal and how this is underpinned and coordinated by its hasbara apparatus.  However, 
the limits of hasbara are revealed in failure of the Israeli state to meaningfully address the 
fundamental human rights of the Palestinians (particularly those living in the OPT and in 
refugee camps in neighbouring countries). With significant efforts spent on soft power and 
public relations activity in an attempt to legitimise the policies of the state (such as the building 
of settlement on the OPT), one doubts whether a genuine solution to the Palestinian question 
will be possible. A just settlement with the Palestinians is essential with the current policy 
approach of Israeli state and hasbara neglecting Nye’s (2004:110) observation that “Actions 
speak louder than words, and public diplomacy that appears to be mere window dressing for 
the projection of hard power is unlikely to succeed.”  
 
Conclusion 
Hosting the U-21 tournament allowed the Israelis demonstrated they could successfully stage 
an international sports event with no ‘terrorist’ incident or protest (within the country). It 
allowed the Israeli state to present a positive image of itself as a sporting host and create a 
positive impression of the IFA within UEFA/FIFA and other international sporting bodies. At 
the same time, the Palestinians used the tournament to highlight their situation with European-
based pro-Palestinian organisations spotlighting what they saw as a racist, apartheid system 
using a sports event to cover-up its fundamental lack of human rights.  
 
 
 
The Men’s U-21 tournament is traditionally a ‘small’ event which rarely attracts much interest 
from the mainstream media and wider public. However, this particular tournament did have 
symbolic value in the context of Middle East politics and in the struggle for legitimacy sought 
by both Israel and Palestine. The football tournament, when located within Israel’s wider 
hasbara efforts, has allowed for constructive discussion on the competing discourses associated 
with the soft power thesis. Whilst the Israeli state does not appear to be overtly interest in 
football they are increasingly cognisant of their international image and are using ‘hasbara’ – 
be this related to sport, tourism, culture, academic - to counter the growth of the BDS 
movement. This discussion has extended the findings of Manzenreiter (2010) and Brannagan 
and Giulianotti (2014) by demonstrating how Israel is seeking to differentiate itself from its 
regional neighbours, to demonstrate that they are ‘like their fellow Europeans’ in their love of 
sport and that they are capable of successfully hosting an international sporting event.  
 
When the international news media carry images of heavily armed Israeli security forces 
responding to peaceful, unarmed protestors or stone-throwing youngsters with tear gas, plastic 
and live bullets, discussion of soft diplomacy tends to fall away. Throughout its short history 
the Israeli state has responded aggressively to ensure its survival and shown little inhibition in 
using its hard (military) power; however, the landscape is changing and they have recognised 
they are facing a threat they cannot challenge exclusively via their military capability. The turn 
to hasbara to articulate their national interests has been necessary to confront the growing 
disquiet at its military actions. Likewise, the majority of Palestinians, having realised they 
cannot compete militarily with the Israeli state, have changed tactics by supporting the Intifadas 
and by making greater use of soft power. The global popularity of football makes it an attractive 
‘soft power’ vehicle; thus the claim that sport and politics do not mix is little more than a 
hackneyed, nonsensical myth. Although ‘sport’ can be used to bring communities together, just 
because it is seen as ‘soft’ does not necessarily make it ‘good.’ What it can do is provide cover 
for inaction and the legitimisation of the status quo and unequal power relations. 
 
Whilst both the Israelis and Palestinian (and their supporters) will claim success in terms of 
winning international public opinion, as Grix and Houlihan (2013:19) have noted “it is far 
more challenging to demonstrate a causal relationship between sport soft power initiatives and 
progress towards specific diplomatic objectives.’ This paper has offered a critical assessment 
of the concept of soft power within the context of a relatively small international sporting event; 
 
 
however, the imprecision and elusiveness of the base concept of soft power, makes it possible 
to identify only the immediate, but not the longer term, impact(s) of the staging the event. Soft 
power, in all its manifestations, is set to play an increasing role in the politics of the region with 
both the Israeli state and the Palestinian people using football to play out their aspirations.  
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1 Nye developed the concept of ‘soft power’ with Admiral William Owens (a military planner who 
became a vice-chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff). 
2 In 2012 Israel’s international image was polled ahead of only North Korea, Pakistan and Iran see 
http://www.jpost.com/National-News/Poll-Israel-viewed-negatively-around-the-world  
3 The negative stereotypes of Jews are rooted in specific historical circumstances with early prejudice 
based on accusations of being Christ’s ‘killers’ and continued through the ‘blood liable’ falsehoods, 
the expulsion of Jews from various European countries throughout the last millennial, the 19th century 
East European pogroms and the Holocaust (Shoah). 
4 For example, anti-Israel bias was seen in March 2014 when the UNHRC debated five resolutions on 
Israel - far fewer than all other neighbouring countries (Lazaroff, 2014).  
5 “As was recently revealed, senior Israeli officials have been training such Israel-friendly lawyers 
for some time in an effort to deal with deligitimisation claims against Israel, such as appeals to arrest 
senior Israeli officials allegedly involved in war crimes.” (Molad, 2012: 35) 
6 The proposal in May 2014 by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu to officially designate Israel as a 
Jewish state could be seen as strengthening the central hasbara strategy. 
7 Aliyah literally means ‘ascent.’ A basic tenet of Zionism it describes the act of immigration by a 
Jewish person to Israel. 
8 “Today there are more than seven million Palestinian refugees around the world. Israel denies their 
right to return to their homes and land – a right recognised by UN resolution 194, the Geneva 
convention, and the universal declaration of human rights. Further, "an occupier may not forcibly 
deport protected persons... or transfer parts of its own civilian population into occupied territory" 
[Article 49] see Hayeem, 2010).  
9 See also USACBI in the USA, AURDIP in France, PBAI in Spain, and the Teachers Union of 
Ireland. When the Palestine Polytechnic University was closed by Israeli authorities in 2003, 
Palestinian academics requested support from Israeli academics, but found none was forthcoming 
(Parr, 2014). As a result, the Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel 
(PACBI) was launched by a group of Palestinian academics in 2004. 
10 Greater Israel – which includes the regions of Judea and Samaria, currently known as the West 
Bank.  
11 The exceptions being South Africa whose FA was expelled in 1976 due to the government's 
apartheid policies, the Yugoslavian FA (in 1992) due to the conflict in the Balkans (Mills, 2009), and 
the Iraq FA in 2009. Other examples include Spain (2008), Brunei and Nigeria (both 2010). In 2014 
although the Uruguay Football Association was suspended by Conmebol (the South American 
football confederation), over a domestic power struggle, FIFA stated that the team could still attend 
the 2014 FIFA World Cup. 
12 Of the 24 signatures, 14 were Labour Party members, 7 Liberal Democrats, and one from Plaid 
Cymru, the Respect MP (George Galloway) and the Green MP (Caroline Lucas). Early Day Motions 
                                                            
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
are used by individual MPs to draw attention to specific campaigns or events. Very few are actually 
debated in the chamber but they often receive media coverage and generate public interest.  
13 One suitably-sized event is the UEFA’s Champions League Final which, in 2013, was aired to over 
200 countries and an estimated global average audience of 150 million (UEFA, 2013). In March 2014, 
Israel was designated host for the 2015 European Short Course Swimming Championships. 
14 In April 2014 Israel submitted a bid to host part of UEFA’s 2020 European Championship; 
although their bid was unsuccessful it received similar criticisms to their U-21 tournament with 
opponents claiming it would be ‘a mockery of Fifa’s (sic) Mission and Statutes if Jerusalem were 
awarded the status of hosting games in this tournament’ (Austin et al, 2014: 30). 
15 Along with not being seen as farmers or soldiers - hence the prioritisation within early Zionism of 
the ‘muscular Jew’ - most evident within the kibbutzim movements. 
